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The opportunity in private equity secondaries, particularly in the middle market, continues to be worthy of allocator attention.
authors
Troy A. Gayeski
Troy A. Gayeski
Chief Market Strategist

Well, the last days of summer are upon us! I hope everyone has enjoyed the warm weather and that your fall plans are lining up nicely.

As you recall from the last Perspective, Delayed but not denied: July markets and strategy update, we discussed various sectoral opportunities in middle market private equity—the definition of growth at a reasonable price (GARP), commercial real estate lending and private credit more broadly. After discussing that note with our CIO, Mike Kelly (the architect of our investment platform), I wanted to provide additional color on the continued persistence of the secondary opportunity for those in a position to provide liquidity to motivated sellers.

Simply put: The secondary opportunity in private equity, particularly in the middle market, continues to be worthy of allocator attention.

The most recent secondary opportunity

Asa reminder, the recent potential opportunity in secondaries [MB1] first manifested itself in 2022, when not only did you have a slowdown in initial public offerings (IPOs) and mergers and acquisitions (M&A) activity (less liquidity provided to long term PE investors), but also a painful denominator effect when both equities and bonds were simultaneously annihilated as the Fed embarked on a relentless crusade to tighten monetary policy. The Fed tightened both by jacking up the Fed funds rate and by actually shrinking money supply at the fastest rate since the GreatDepression in order to respond to “non-transitory” inflation.

The problem was compounded by the sheer size of recent allocations from institutions.As shown in the chart below (“Vast majority of PE AUM invested by institutions and mega QPs”), the vast majority of PE capital that was ever raised up to that point came in the five years up to and including 2022.

Vast majority of PE AUM invested by institutions and mega QPs

Bar chart showing the aggregate capital raised for private equity funds versus the capital raised specifically by evergreen private equity funds. The chart highlights how a vast majority of assets are raised by institutions, with evergreen funds representing a smaller portion of the total capital raised.
Source: Preqin as of December 31, 2022.

The problem was also exacerbated by the fact that institutions were overweight PE(numerator and denominator) and in some cases in negative cash flow positions as shown in the following two charts (“North American pension fund private-equity allocation” and “Limited partner net cash flows”).

North American pension fund private-equity allocation

Bar chart showing the aggregate capital raised for private equity funds versus the capital raised specifically by evergreen private equity funds. The chart highlights how a vast majority of assets are raised by institutions, with evergreen funds representing a smaller portion of the total capital raised.
Source: Preqin, as of December 31, 2024.

Limited partner net cash flows

Area chart showing limited partner (LP) net cash flows, highlighting how LPs are deeply net cashflow negative, with negative cash flows reflecting the capital calls exceeding distributions over the period.
Source: Preqin, as of September 30, 2024.  

The opportunity in secondaries persists

Given both the need for liquidity and the denominator effect, 2022 provided attractive price entry points of this cycle, as is shown in the following chart (“LP portfolio pricing”). Prices have rebounded as some of the extreme selling pressures of 2022 and 2023 have abated. As we saw above, U.S. pensions are still overweight PE, but their cash flow position has fortunately improved.

LP portfolio pricing

Line chart showing the average limited partner (LP) portfolio pricing as a percentage of NAV for buyout deals, venture deals, and all strategies since 2018. The chart highlights how pricing fell dramatically in the wake of COVID but has trended higher over the last two years.
Source: Jefferies, “Global Secondary MarketReview, July 2025.”

However, the opportunity in secondaries has persisted both in terms of volume (inevitably increasing) and still relatively attractive pricing (if you can source the right assets at the right price) far longer than I would have thought at the end of 2022. The fact that 2025 secondary volume is expected to be roughly double that of 2022—albeit at more normalized pricing—says it all, as we can see in the chart below (“Secondary market volume”).

Secondary market volume

Bar chart showing annual secondaries transaction volume since 2018 broken out by LP-led secondaries and GP-led secondaries. The chart highlights how GP-led secondaries are accounting for a larger percentage of overall secondaries transactions in recent years.
Source: Jefferies, “Global Secondary Market Review, July 2025.”

So let’s explore the continued drivers of the opportunity now.

Today’s opportunity in secondaries

The first phenomenon that has driven the need for liquidity is the well-publicized slowdown in IPO and M&A volume since a recent peak in 2021. This can be analyzed a variety of ways, but the following chart showing PE transactions (“Steady supply of deals in U.S. middle market”) sums it up pretty well: Large and mega cap PE transactions are down considerably (about 65%) from their 2021 peak.

However, in the middle market, private equity transactions are down only 30%from their recent peak and, despite a slow Q2 courtesy of Liberation Day and the trade war, the true middle market (companies between $10 million and $1 billion of revenue) is still on track to continue to exceed pre-pandemic transaction volumes. Thus, the lack of liquidity in PE is primarily a problem for large and mega cap sponsors while there continues to be adequate transaction volume for investors focused on the middle market to enter and exit portfolio positions.

Steady supply of deals in U.S. middle market

Bar chart showing the annual number of U.S. private equity buyout transactions since 2011, broken out by deal size. Large and mega-cap transactions include deals larger than $500 million, while middle-market transactions range from $25 million to $500 million. The chart highlights that the majority of transactions are middle-market deals.
Source: Pitchbook Q2 2025 PE Breakdown U.S. Buyout Deal Breakdown.

Institutions have become concentrated in more recent PE vintages

Another way of wrapping your brain around the continued drivers of record secondary volume are the following charts which show how concentrated institutions have become in more recent vintages in PE (no surprise, given the data in the first chart below, “Vintage composition in LP-led deals”) as well as the collapsing level of private equity exits vs. investments shown in the second chart below (“U.S.private equity exits-to-investments ratio”).

It doesn’t take a rocket scientist to figure out that if most of your exposure to PE is very recent vintages in a poor exit environment, then the third chart below (“Median TVPI by vintage year”) would look pretty grim for recent PE vintages.

Vintage composition in LP-led deals

Stacked column chart showing distribution to paid-in capital (DPI) ratios.
Source: Lazard Private Capital Advisory. Secondary Market Report 2024.

U.S. private equity exits-to-investments ratio

Line chart showing U.S. private equity exits-to-investments ratio.
Source: Pitchbook as of March 31, 2025.Investments exclude add-on acquisitions.

Median TVPI by vintage year

Column chart showing median total value to paid-in capital (TVPI) by vintage year.
Source: Pitchbook, as of June 30, 2024. Evercore. HEC.

Liquidity being provided has shifted to other PE sponsors

One of the best ways of thinking about this evolution of markets is that there isn’t a problem of liquidity (like we had in the Global Financial Crisis), it’s just that the liquidity being provided by the market to long-term institutional PE investors has shifted from the IPO market and corporate M&A, to other PE sponsors participating in private to private transactions and the secondary market, both for LP-led and GP-led (aka continuation vehicles). 

Focusing on longer-term asset growth

Something to consider with respect to evergreenPE funds is that, if a fund is overly reliant on marking up the discount to drive short-term performance and not focused enough on longer-term asset growth of the secondary, future performance may be impacted negatively. If you look at the chart below (“Illustrative secondary investments based on discount and forward annualized return”), you can clearly see you are likely better off paying more (less discount) for faster growing assets than gorging on extremely cheap secondaries that have little upside after the discount markup.

Illustrative secondary investments based on discount and forward annualized return

Line chart showing the dollar growth in value of two hypothetical secondary investments over the next 5 years. Fund A is purchased at a 10% discount with a CAGR of 12%, while Fund B is purchased at a 25% discount with a CAGR of 4%. Despite the higher initial price, Fund A delivers stronger returns, achieving a 1.96x multiple compared to Fund B's 1.62x, highlighting the importance of purchasing high-quality secondaries over simply focusing on the discount.
Source: Future Standard.
For illustrative purposes only. Not indicative of future performance.

Conclusion: The secondary market opportunity persists

To summarize, fortunately, the secondary market opportunity persists.

AtFuture Standard, we are particularly excited about opportunities to source high quality assets at reasonable discounts in the LP secondary market, as well as to selectively participate in the GP-led/continuation vehicle market where the risk/return profile can approach that of co-investments.

contributing authors
Troy A. Gayeski
Troy A. Gayeski
Chief Market Strategist
footnotes + disclosures

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